Green Consumption and relative preferences in an international ologopoly by Zanaj, Skerdilajda et al.
The opinions and results mentioned in this paper do not reflect the position of the Institution 
 CREA  
Discussion
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ange the formatting of the pull quote text box.] 
 
 
 
 :s  def.uni.lu/index.php/fdef_FR/economie/crea 
 
 
 
 
 
  
CREA 
Discussion  
Paper 
   
2016-16  
 
 
Economics 
  
Green consumption and relative preferences 
in an international oligopoly
 
 
available online : http://wwwfr.uni.lu/recherche/fdef/crea/publications2/discussion_papers  
 
Ornella Tarola, CREA, Université du Luxembourg 
Giulia Ceccantoni, CREA, Université du Luxembourg
Skerdilajda Zanaj, CREA, Université du Luxembourg 
 
November, 2016 
 
For editorial correspondence, please contact: crea@uni.lu  
University of Luxembourg  
Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance  
162A, avenue de la Faïencerie  
L-1511 Luxembourg
Centre for Research in Economics and Management 
University of Luxembourg 
 
Green consumption and relative preferences
in an international oligopoly
Giulia Ceccantoni, Ornella Tarolay, Skerdilajda Zanajz
November 7, 2016
MEMOTEF, University of Rome, La sapienza Via Del Castro Laurenziano 9, Roma,
00161. Email: giulia.ceccantoni@uniroma1.it
yDISSE, University of Rome, La Sapienza Piazzale Aldo Moro, 5, Rome, 00100, Tel:
+39 0649910253, Fax: +39 0649690326. Email: ornella.tarola@uniroma1.it
zCorresponding Author: CREA, University of Luxembourg. Address: 162A, avenue de
la Faiencerie, L-1511, Luxembourg. Tel: (+352) 4666 44 6464; Fax (+352) 46 66 44 6341
email: skerdilajda.zanaj@uni.lu
1
Abstract
We consider an open to trade North-South two-country model with two
vertically di¤erentiated goods and relative preferences in consumption. Dif-
ferentiation is along an environmental quality dimension. Analyzing the
equilibrium conguration, we nd that the green rm obtains higher prots
under relative preferences than in their absence, whereas a brown rm is pe-
nalized by them if trade is su¢ ciently liberalized. Moreover, under relative
preferences in both countries, trade liberalization is benecial for the green
producer but detrimental for the brown rival. Importantly, this nding does
not hold when these preferences are only present in the developing country
where the brown good is produced. In this case, the process of trade liberal-
ization can be environmentally detrimental since it can favor the brown rm
in terms of prots, while penalizing the green rival.
Keywords: relative preferences; green consumption; vertical di¤erentia-
tion; international oligopoly; trade liberalization.
JEL Classication Numbers: D11; F18; L13.
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1 Introduction
"There is strong agreement across the EU about the ethics
of environmentally-friendly products: 95% of respondents agreed
that using environmentally products is the right thing to do,
91% agreed that buying environmentally-friendly products sets a
good example and 80% agreed that their family and friends would
think it was a good thing if they used environmentally-friendly
products." Eurobarometer, 2013 (italics added by the authors).
When buying green products, people advertise their worthy attitude with
respect to the environment and this attitude is more valuable, the less respon-
sible are their peers (Frey and Meier, 2004). Accordingly, the satisfaction of
consuming environmentally friendly product depends not only on the intrin-
sic characteristics of the good but also on its social content : the comparison
of ones own consumption and goods environmental quality to that of others.
In this paper, we wonder how the social content of green goods can
a¤ect green consumption and provide rms with an incentive to produce
environmental-friendly goods in an open economy with trade. This research
question seems critical in light of the current presidential race in US with
so polarized positions with respect to environmental issues, and of the much
debated TTIP, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, between the
US and EU.
Three considerations inspire our analysis. First of all, green consumption
is at least partially driven by social norms. They are intended as a set of
shared values, behaviours and beliefs (Dietz et al, 2005; Steg and de Groot,
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2012) and provide a social mechanism which sanctions any deviation from
this set. Due to these norms, buying green goods provides the status of
"good citizen" while purchasing brown product condemns to a social stigma.
In 2007, the New York Times cited the main reasons why Toyota Prius
owners bought their hybrid cars. It emerged that the buyers had "only
a basic understanding of environmental issues or the ecological benets of
HEVs (hybrid electric vehicles)" and they purchased only because it shows
the world that its owner cares1 (He¤ner et al 2007, p. 409).
An approach to this view passes through relative preferences. These pref-
erences capture the idea that consumers strive for a relative position among
peers thereby relating satisfaction from their own consumption to the con-
sumption of the others. Under relative preferences, people are willing to pay
di¤erent prices for functionally equivalent goods because of the conspicuous
nature of some of them2. "Whether it is termed "status," "prestige," or "dis-
tinction," people sometimes seek - as an end in itself - relative position....and
generally gain or lose satisfaction according to how well they do compared
to others" (McAdams, 1992, 3).
Second, the green content of social norms di¤ers according to the coun-
try where people live, their income, the behavior of their community inter
alia. As documented by Litina et al. (2016), environmental culture that
1http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/04/business/04hybrid.html?_r=0#addendums
2These ideas resemble those of Veblen (1899) in his seminal contribution "Theory of
the Leisure Class", where conspicuous consumption is the means by which consumers
a¢ rm, promote and maintain their social status in the modern consumer society. Later
Duesenderry (1949) exploits economic modelling to formalize the social content within the
maximizing behavior in consumption choices and economic activities.
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determines social norms is country-specic and it is furthermore intergenere-
tionally transmitted from parents to children. Authors argue that environ-
mental attitudes, as the willingness to pay for environment, are a product of
economic and environmental conditions in the country of residence but are
also a product of cultural orientations. Additionally, individual perceptions
about the causes of pollution seem quite di¤erent among people living in
developing and developed countries as reported by The Health of the Planet
Survey (Dunlap and Metig, 1995). People living in developed countries show
much more awareness about the role of their individual green versus brown
consumption on pollution in the country of residence. Hence, the responsi-
bility with respect to the environment is more likely to be widespread, the
richer is the country where people live and/or the higher their income level:
feeling responsible w.r.t. environment belongs to a set of values arising after
essential needs have been satised.
The aftermath of this literature is that people in developing countries
have been doomed to be less involved so far in green issues than citizens in
developed countries. In the latter, political and economic institutions have
been traditionally concerned with environmental protection and there is still
a hot debate among politicians about the rules to reduce gas emissions. Fur-
ther, pollution damage deriving from unresponsible private behaviors gets
always good press and often green consumption is subsidized. Rather, in the
former countries, for a long time political institutions refused to be involved
in international agreements for reducing the environmental damage and ac-
cepted pollution as a natural price of a fast economic growth. Informative
campaigns failed to clarify the urgency of the environmental issue, and media
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did not sensibilize people to a green behaviour. As a result, the problem of
pollution is extremely severe in these areas and it is currently the unavoidable
challenge for public authorities3.
Third consideration, it is not clear whether this social content of green
consumption will spread worldwide. At least two key drivers will a¤ect it:
(i) the willingness of policy makers to empower the social content of green
goods, (ii) the process of trade liberalization among countries that makes
available globally green and brown products. As far as driver (i), since 2009
Obama has shown a constructive interest on climate change and environ-
mental issues4. In China a green attitude is only recently emerging: in a
2011 editorial, environment Minister Zhou Shengxian said the depletion,
deterioration, and exhaustion of resources and the worsening ecological en-
3To give an idea of the matter, 16 of the worlds 20 most polluted cities are in China and
rising pollution in the developing world is ranked as the sixth most signicant global trend
this year and in Asia its the third. China became the largest greenhouse gas emitter in
2005 and remains in this position, followed by the United States and the European Union,
according to the World Resources Institute. Brazil and India are the fth and the eighth
biggest.
4Cornerstones of the inclusive environmental policy pursued by Obama were govern-
ment incentives for electric vehicles, for supporting R&D in sustainable technologies and for
communities investing in electric vehicles infrastructure. Since U.S. are a consumer-driven
economy, e¤orts were made also to ensure and protect american consumers while impos-
ing higher e¢ ciency standards for energy consumption (e.g. the so called "Lightbulb law"
which increased e¢ ciency standards ensuring monetary savings on energy consumption for
american consumers. The light bulb law of Obama administration was strongly defeated
by Republicans and in 2011 they proposed and unsuccessfully voted a bill to withdraw
that more stringent standards. (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/13/business/energy-
environment/republicans-fail-to-annul-new-light-bulb-law.html)
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vironment have become bottlenecks and grave impediments to the nations
economic and social development" and in September 2016 the Chinese Pres-
ident Xi Jinping the Paris Agreement and Xi committed to cooperate with
Barack Obama on two other global environmental agreements this year 
an amendment to the Montreal Protocol to phase down air-conditioning re-
frigerants and on a market-based measure to reduce carbon emissions from
aviation. Nevertheless, in recent years, Donald Trump stated on Twitter
that "the concept of global warming was created by and for the Chinese in
order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive" and rejected the posi-
tion taken by scientists about man-made global warming, saying that climate
change is a "total hoax". Further, in May 2016, in one of his speeches and in
contrast with the position taken by Hillary Clinton on environmental issues,
he said to be willing to cancel the Paris climate agreement. Since the set of
values embodied by social norms is dramatically a¤ected by politicians and
media, in US consumersinvolvement in environmental protection is mainly
depending on the presidential race5.
As far as driver (ii), liberalizing trade enables rms to export at rela-
tively lower costs, thereby making available worldwide goods, regardless of
the place where they are produced. Due to trade liberalization, consumers
get familiar with green and brown good, that they would not know in ab-
sence of trade. When interiorizing social norms, they may express relative
preferences with respect to these goods. Typically, the more liberalized the
5It is worth remarking that since the Paris agreement needs to be ratied by 55 coun-
tries, representing 55% of global emissions, in order to come into e¤ect, the role of US
turns out to be crucial even for this.
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trade, the lower the equilibrium prices and the larger the quantities of traded
goods6. Nonetheless, if green goods are viewed as a means to get a socially
worthy position whereas brown consumption becomes a blameworthy prac-
tice, the reduction in prices of green goods, which could be induced by trade
liberalization, can be dampened. This in turn can have an impact on the
traded quantity of goods. The empirical literature testifying that high qual-
ity goods (in our analysis, this is the green good) do have a higher price
even in presence of trade and trade policy (Baldwin and Harrigan, 2011,
Fajgebaum et al, 2011) abounds.
The basic framework
The model developed hereafter combines in a unied frame the above
ingredients. It analyses the e¤ects of relative preferences on the equilibrium
conguration of an international oligopoly consisting of two (sets of) coun-
tries: developing and developed countries. The former produces a dirty good
while the latter specialize in the production of a clean good7. Each rm
exports its product thereby facing an iceberg cost which is lower, the more
liberalized is trade. Introducing this cost in the model enables to consider
how the protability to produce green versus brown goods changes with the
process of trade liberalization.
6A good survey of the industrial organisation models nested with international trade
is Krugman (1989).
7This assumption is in line with the traditional view of a North-South model of produc-
tion where dirty productions are relegated in less developed countries, the green ones being
rather in the more advanced groups of nations (in trade models for instance in Fajgebaum
et al, 2011).
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When dening consumption behaviour in a country, we do not depart
from the well-known concept of homo economicus, a rational and self-interested
agent who traditionally maximizes his/her utility. Rather, borrowing from
the literature on relative preferences, we reconcile the traditional approach
with the idea that human beings are (at least partially) a¤ected by social
interaction and driven in their behaviour by some precise group norms whose
content is a¤ected by several factors such as education, income and politi-
cal institutions of a country. Accordingly, we assume that goods are valued
along two dimensions: intrinsic quality and social component. The former,
in line with the traditional model of vertical di¤erentiation à la Mussa and
Rosen, is such that the absolute quality of a variant determines its utility.
So, the green good is the high quality variant along the quality ladder since
it dominates the competing and low-quality alternative from an environmen-
tal viewpoint. The latter, inspired to the approach of relative preferences,
induces consumers to value a variant depending on its relative environmental
quality, namely the quality gap between the variant itself and the alterna-
tive one. The quality gap between variants determines the social satisfaction
obtained by each good and thus xes its place along a social ladder.
Under the assumption of country-specic relative preferences, we charac-
terize the equilibrium conguration of the oligopoly and study how it would
change with trade liberalization.
In order to incorporate the above considerations we consider di¤erent
scenarios. After presenting the model (Section 2), we provide the description
of the setup without relative preferences (Section 3); then, we characterize
in Section 4 a scenario where consumers in both developed and developing
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countries display relative preferences. Inhere, we advance the hypothesis that
under Hillary Clintons administration consumers in US would be strongly
concerned with environmental issues thereby attributing to green goods some
social content. Along the same rationale, China will keep its commitment to
reduce pollution and sensibilize people to responsible behavior so that green
consumption will become a conspicuous practice.
Then, in Section 5 we assume that relative preferences emerge only in
one country. In particular, we consider rst the case when green awareness is
widespread among consumers living in developing countries while being ab-
sent in developed areas (Section 5.1). In this scenario, we contrast the green
pattern undertaken by Chinese Government and the possible consumersat-
titude in US under Trump administration. On this, it is worth remarking
that in US not only the candidatesviewpoint on environmental issues are
poles apart but also the votersopinion on climate change. Back in 2008,
surveys highlighted how democrats and republicans voters had di¤erent per-
ception with respect on environmental issues. For questions on the e¤ect of
global warming, the exacerbated views of media or the human responsibil-
ity on climate change, democrats and republicans gap was quite wide and it
will certainly increase if Trump will be the new President of US. Finally, in
Section 5.2 we assume consumers in developed countries display relative pref-
erences for environmental quality thereby getting from green goods a social
and psychological benet behind the needs they can satisfy. These relative
preferences do not emerge in the developing counterparts. This scenario cap-
tures the current political agenda of Barack Obama in US as counterposed
to the weak Chinas commitment to green issues. These political trends are
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leading consumers in US to interiorize some environmental norms and those
in China to attribute to green goods no social content.
Our main results concern the e¤ect of trade liberalization on good prices
and on pollution. The presence of relative preferences in both countries
is benecial for the green rm and this benet can be boosted by trade
liberalization. Importantly, these ndings cannot be extended to the case
when relative preferences are relegated to the less advanced country where
the brown good is produced. In this case, the process of trade liberalization
can be environmentally detrimental since it can favor the brown rm in terms
of prots, while penalizing the green rival who faces lower price and quantity.
This result emerges when citizens in the developed economies do not attribute
a social content to green consumption.
Our analysis complements the recent theoretical literature on social norms
and pro-environmental behavior (see e.g., Stern, 2000; Brekke et al., 2003)
thereby contributing to the debate on the impact of environmentally friendly
behavior on market equilibrium (Conrad, 2005; Eriksson, 2004; Garcia-Gallego
and Georgantzs, 2009; Moraga-Gonzalez and Padron-Fumero, 2002; Nyborg
et al., 2006; Rodriguez-Ibeas 2007). More specically, we extend this litera-
ture and consider the e¤ects of social norms on environment in an open econ-
omy when trade is liberalized. Our modeling framework is directly inspired by
Ben Elhadj and Tarola (2015) where the social component of consumption is
formalized by relative preferences and introduced in a model of vertical di¤er-
entiation. Nesting their analysis in an international oligopoly has many and
fruitful implications. First, it enables to characterize the equilibrium cong-
uration of an open economy depending on the di¤erences between trading
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countries (i.e. income and sociocultural development). Further, it allows to
consider how this conguration change with trade liberalization.
2 The Model
Consider a North-South two-country model with two vertically di¤erentiated
goods along an environmental quality dimension. Each country is populated
by a single rm. We label Green and Brown each country and the corre-
sponding rm within the country. The Green (resp. Brown) rm produces
the high (resp. low) environmental variant qG (resp. qB)8. The range of
quality is in the interval

q; q

where q is the highest quality level which are
technologically feasible and q > 0 is the lowest one. Each rm can serve
both countries. When serving the foreign market, it incurs iceberg trade
costs  ; 1    0. Trade costs are related not only to the geographical dis-
tance between countries but also and mainly to cultural barriers, tari¤s and
administrative costs. This distance determines a gap between the quantity
produced to serve the foreign market and the one actually arrived at desti-
nation. More specically, from the rms viewpoint, this distance creates a
8In our analysis, like in Rodriguez-Ibeas (2007) and Andre et al. (2009), the meaning of
the variable qi; i = G;B is in line with the traditional approach in vertical di¤erentiation
as in Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979). In other models, it is
related to the abatement e¤ort of rms a¤ecting the emission intensity of goods. Typically,
the lower the emission intensity per unit of production, the higher the environmental
quality of the product. See, for example, Moraga-Gonzalez and Padro-Fumero (2002) and
Lombardini-Riipinen (2005). In a further strand of literature, di¤erent levels of social
responsibility of producers determine vertical di¤erentiation between products (see, e.g.,
Garcia-Gallego and Georgantz¬s, 2009).
12
gap between the quantity produced to serve the foreign market and the one
generating prots. When  is closer to 1, trade costs are relatively low and
the quantity produced to serve the foreign market is similar to the one deter-
mining prots. When  is close to 0, then trade barriers erode a signicant
amount of quantity targeted to the foreign market with a negative e¤ect on
prots, ceteris paribus.
As for the demand side, in each country, consumers are characterized
by their willingness to pay for environmental quality indexed by , uniformly
distributed in the interval [0;i] i = G;B; with density 1=i and G > B9:
Each consumer is assumed to buy at most one unit of the good.
3 The baseline scenario: absence of relative
preferences
In this section, we dene a baseline scenario where consumers display the
same preferences with respect to variants, so that their indirect utility func-
tion U () writes as
Uj () =
8>>><>>>:
qG   pG if she buys G
qB   pB if she buys B
0 otherwise
:
9Since the lowest willingness to pay in each country is 0, changing the highest willingness
to pay, namely highest level of income, also determines a change in the average income of
the country.
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Thus, demand function of each rm can be written as follows
xG(pG; pB) = (B   pG   pB
qG   qB ) +

G   pG   pB
qG   qB

xB(pG; pB) =
pG   pB
qG   qB  
pB
qB
+ (
pG   pB
qG   qB  
pB
qB
)
In this setting, the maximization of the prots of the rms given simply by
pixi(pi; pj); i; j = B;G, i 6= j; yield the candidate equilibrium prices
pG = (qG   qB) (G+B)2qG(4qG qB)(+1)
pB = (qG   qB) (G+B)qB(4qG qB)(+1) :
The corresponding demands at equilibrium write as
xG =
(G + B)2qG
4qG   qB and x

B = qG
(G + B)
(4qG   qB) :
In this framework the typical e¤ects of trade on the equilibrium congura-
tion emerge so that the equilibrium prices of the variants decrease and the
corresponding demands raise as the trade gets more and more liberalized.
4 Relative preferences in both countries
We assume in this section that consumers in both countries, namely the
developed and developing one, display relative preferences. Accordingly, they
benet from a social/psychological premium if they buy the higher quality
variant or su¤er a penalty if they buy the dirty product. We characterize the
equilibrium conguration and consider the e¤ect of trade liberalization on it.
Formally, the indirect utility function in country i, with i = G;B writes
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as follows:
Ui () =
8<: qG   pG + i(qG   qB) if she buys G0 otherwise
and
Ui () =
8<: qB   pB   i(qG   qB) if she buys B0 otherwise.
In the above formulation, we add to the traditional utility function a social
driver i(qG   qB) capturing the existence of relative preferences. This term
denes the social benet (or the social punishment) which is obtained (or
su¤ered) by the consumer when purchasing the green (or the brown) vari-
ant of the good. Ceteris paribus, this social component increases with the
gap between environmental qualities: the higher the environmental quality
of the green variant with respect to the dirty product, the stronger the social
rewards or the ercer the social punishment for the consumers10. The inten-
sity of the relative preferences is given by the parameter i: It is assumed
G > B and thus in the more developed country, namely country G; social
drivers attached to the environmental quality are more signicant than those
in the less developed country, namely country B: This is in line with the idea
that green norms are interiorized after the basic needs have been satised11.
Thus, the indi¤erent consumer between buying the green variant and the
10Interestingly, the introduction of these relative preferences determines a correspon-
dence between the relative position of a variant along a quality ladder (namely its quality
compared with the quality made available by the competing rm) and the relative position
(a social status) of the consumer buying that variant along a social ladder.
11See on this Ben-Elhadj and Tarola (2014).
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brown one in country G and country B; G and B; respectively write as
G(pG; pB) =
pG   pB   2G(qG   qB)
qG   qB
B(pG; pB) =
pG   pB   2B(qG   qB)
qG   qB ;
while the indi¤erent consumer between buying the low quality variant and
not buying at all, namely ~G; ~B in country G and country B; write as
~G(pB) =
pB+G(qG qB)
qB
and ~B(pB) =
pB + B(qG   qB)
qB
.
Finally ^G(pG) =
pG   G(qG   qB)
qG
and ^B(pG) =
pG   B(qG   qB)
qG
, with
^i(pG) > 0; i¤ pG > G(qG   qB) represent the indi¤erent consumer between
buying the high quality green variant and not buying at all in country G and
country B, respectively. In this framework, the demand functions faced by
rms G and B write, respectively, as:
xG(pG; pB) = (B  K) + G   k
xB(pG; pB) = K   pB + B (qG   qB)
qB
+ (k   pB + G (qG   qB)
qB
)
where K =
pG   pB   2B (qG   qB)
(qG   qB) and k =
pG   pB   2G (qG   qB)
(qG   qB) :
Given the prot function i(pi; pj) = pixi(pi; pj), i; j = B;G, i 6= j; the
pair of equilibrium prices is easily found
pG =
(qG qB)((2G+4G+2B+4B)qG (B+G)(qG+qB))
(4qG qB)(+1)
pB =
(qG qB)((G+2G+B+2B)qB (qG+qB)(2G+2B))
(4qG qB)(+1) :
The corresponding demands at equilibrium are then
xG =
(2G+4G+2B+4B)qG (B+G)(qG+qB)
4qG qB
xB = qG
((G+2G+B+2B)qB (qG+qB)(2G+2B))
qB(4qG qB) :
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Notice that pG > 0 and x

G > 0 always hold whereas p

B and x

B are strictly
positive i¤ B  B = (2B+2G)(qB+qG) qB(G+2G+2B)qB . Since the social
penalty reduces the price of the brown good, for its price to be positive, the
average income of the less advanced country has to be su¢ ciently high.
Denoting by  = BqB+BqG GqB
BqB GqB GqG , we observe that
Proposition 1 Under relative preference, whatever the level of trade liber-
alization, the equilibrium price and quantity of the green variant are higher
than those in the baseline scenario. On the contrary, when the international
trade is su¢ ciently liberalized ( > ), the equilibrium price and the cor-
responding quantity of the brown good are lower than those in absence of
relative preferences.
Proof. From direct comparison of the expressions.
In the case when  >  ; our nding on the equilibrium price of the brown
variant is in line with that emerging in Ben-Elhadj and Tarola (2014) where
rms produce and sell in their home market and exports are not contem-
plated. Indeed, when trade liberalization is very signicant, it is as if the
two areas would collapse to a single market. In this circumstance, one can iso-
late two drivers of equilibrium prices: a price competition driver and a social
driver. The former driver, which is typically observed in a vertically di¤er-
entiated, is such that the larger the quality gap between variants, the less
erce the price competition in the market and thus the higher the equilibrium
prices. The latter is rather linked to the social component of consumption
so that the social benet of buying green raises the equilibrium price of the
green variant like so the social punishment reduces the equilibrium price of
the competing and dirty product. Notice that
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Remark  < 0 , qG > qG with qG = 1B (GqB   BqB)
Thus, the condition  >  is always met when  < 0; namely when the
green variant has a very high environmental quality (qG > qG). In this case,
the price competition driver moves upward the price of the brown good, while
the social driver emphasizes the social frustration of buying the brown good
thereby reducing its corresponding price. This latter force prevails over the
former so that the equilibrium price of the brown product under relative
preferences is lower than in the baseline scenario.
We investigate now the role of trade liberalization on the equilibrium
conguration.
Let us denote G =
(2BqG+4BqG)
qB+qG
and 
0
G =
(BqB+2BqB)
2qB+2qG
; with 
0
G < G:
Then,
Proposition 2 Trade liberalization
(i) increases the quantity sold by each rm i¤ the social driver of con-
sumption is weak (G < 
0
G). It increases the quantity sold by rm G
while it reduces the quantity of rm B i¤ the social component is moder-
ate (
0
G < G < G). Finally, it decreases the quantity sold by each rm i¤
this component is strong (G > G);
(ii) reduces both equilibrium prices.
Proof. As far as the e¤ect of trade liberalization on equilibrium quantity,
from standard computations we nd that
@xG
@
= 2BqG+4BqG GqG GqB
4qG qB R 0,B G 7 G 
(2BqG+4BqG)
qB+qG
@xB
@
= qG
BqB+2BqB 2GqG 2GqB
qB(4qG qB) R 0, G 7 
0
G  (BqB+2BqB)2qB+2qG
Proving the e¤ect on price is straightforward. Q.E.D.
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This nding sounds surprising: trade liberalization can reduce the equilib-
rium quantities while decreasing their price. In particular, this e¤ect emerges
when the intensity of social preferences in country G is relevant.
Traditionally liberalizing the trade determines a reduction of the equilib-
rium prices with a corresponding increase of the traded quantity.
The rationale for our result can be captured as follows. Due to trade
liberalization, the equilibrium price of both variants decreases. Since the
social component in country G driven byG(qG   qB) is very signicant, the
price of the green variant decreases proportionally less than the price of the
brown good. This reduction in prices has a cross-e¤ect: the quantity of the
variant i reduces as a consequence of the price reduction of the competing
variant j: Still, the reduction of xB is less signicant than that of x

G : the high
intensity of the social component G in country Gmagnies the benet (resp.
punishment) of buying the green (resp. dirty) good thereby restraining the
reduction of its price pG while increasing that of the corresponding demand.
Of course, the less relevant this social component (namely the lower G),
the less signicant the gap in price reductions and thus the lower the reduc-
tion in the demand of the green good. In line with this, one can observe
that there exists a value of G under which x

G ceases to decrease: since the
reduction of its equilibrium price is not dampened by the social component
G, it turns out to be so attractive with respect to the competing good that
its demand does not decrease. Finally, for an extremely low value of G;
the social component of consumption ceases to be signicant and the tradi-
tional e¤ects of trade liberalization with reduction in prices and increases in
demand are observed.
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Interestingly, G increases with qG while 
0
G decreases with qG: Accord-
ingly, the higher the value of qG; the larger the set of parameters such that

0
G < B < G holds. So, a product innovation increasing the environmental
quality of the green good makes the green rm better o¤, while making worse
o¤ the brown rival, ceteris paribus.
5 Relative preferences in one country
We assume now that relative preferences are in only one of two countries.
First, we consider the scenario where consumers in developing country have
relative preferences, those in more advanced country having the traditional
utility function. Then, we move to the case in which consumerspreferences
and rms production are aligned: the green (resp. brown) rm is located
where consumers displays more (resp. less) sensitivity for the environment.
In both these scenarios the role of trade cost is crucial.
5.1 Relative preferences in country B
In this scenario, we assume that relative preferences emerge in the less devel-
oped country B where the more pollutant production activity of the brown
rm is located. The pair of equilibrium prices pi; i = G;B writes as
pG = (qG   qB) (G+B+2B)2qG B(qG+qB)(4qG qB)(+1)
pB = (qG   qB) (G+B+2B)qB 2B(qG+qB)(4qG qB)(+1)
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with the corresponding demand at equilibrium being:
xG =
(G+B+2B)2qG B(qG+qB)
4qG qB
xB = qG
(G+B+2B)qB 2B(qG+qB)
qB(4qG qB) :
The candidate equilibrium price pB is positive i¤
G >  with  =
2B(qG+qB) 2BqB
qB
 B :
Since  > , then pB > 0 , pG > 0: The price of the green variant
pG is positive i¤ the more advanced country has a su¢ ciently high average
income, namely G >  where  =
B(qB+qG) 4BqG
2qG
  B with   0
for B  12qG (B (qB + qG)  4BqG). In the general analysis with relative
preferences in both countries, the positivity of the price of the green variant
was met, regardless of the average income in country G: This is due to the
fact that now the social rewards from buying the green variant is weaker
than in this setting. As immediate consequence, the green price is lower
under relative preferences in country B than under relative preferences in
both countries.
In particular, denoting by _ = (qB+qG)
4qG
; we nd that
Proposition 3 Under relative preferences only in the brown market, (i) both
the equilibrium price and demand of the green variant are higher than those
in the baseline i¤ trade is su¢ ciently liberalized ( > _); (ii) the equilibrium
price and the corresponding demand of the brown good are lower than those
in absence of relative preferences.
Proof. From direct comparison of the expressions.
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Accordingly, when the social component of consumption holds only in
the less advanced country, the brown rm is penalized by the existence of
relative preferences, regardless of trade costs: the social penalty su¤ered by
consumers when buying the dirty product moves downward its price. Along
the same rationale, the green rm benets from these preferences only under
a su¢ ciently high liberalization: when trade costs are not relevant, the social
rewards emerging in the less developed country turns out to be signicant
thereby moving upward the willingness to pay for the green good.
Nonetheless, it gets higher than in the baseline where the social compo-
nent does not play any role, namely pG > pG > p

G:
We investigate now the role of trade liberalization on the equilibrium con-
guration, under the assumption of relative preferences in countryB: Typi-
cally, as a natural consequence of trade liberalization, equilibrium prices of
the traded goods tend to reduce while demand of products to increase. This
phenomenon determines a positive e¤ect on consumerssurplus and possibly
on rmsprots if the increase in quantity can countervail the reduction in
prices.
Let us dene  = 2GqG 2BqG
qB+5qG
and ^ = GqB BqB
4qB+2qG
: We claim the follow-
ing proposition:
Proposition 4 Trade liberalization
(i) increases (resp. decreases) both prices whenever the intensity of rela-
tive preferences is high (resp. low), namely i¤ B >  (resp. B < ^). For
any  > B > ^, it increases the price of the brown variant and decreases
the one of the green rm.
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(ii) always increases the quantity produced by both rm.
Proof. @pG
@
= (qG   qB) BqB+5BqG+2BqG 2GqG(4qG qB)(+1)2 R 0, B R  =
2GqG 2BqG
qB+5qG
@pB
@
= (qG   qB) 4BqB+2BqG+BqB GqB(4qG qB)(+1)2 R 0, B R ^ =
GqB BqB
4qB+2qG
.
Finally notice that  > ^ always holds. Q.E.D.
The rationale underlying the above Proposition can be expressed as fol-
lows. When the social component of consumption is very signicant, trade
liberalization benets both rms: the green producer takes advantage from
the social rewards for consumers in country B which moves upward their will-
ingness to pay for the environmentally friendly good; the price of the brown
variant is rather positively a¤ected by the relatively higher willingness to pay
of consumers in country G:When the social component is low, the traditional
ndings emerge with trade liberalization reducing prices and increasing the
corresponding traded quantities. Finally, for intermediate values of the social
component, on one hand the social punishment penalizing the dirty product
is weak so that the brown rm can get benet from exporting to the more
advanced (and richer) country and selling to consumers who disregard the
social content of the goods. On the other hand, the price of the green variant
is moved downward by the low willingness to pay of consumers in country
B; for which the social rewards of buying socially worthy goods play a minor
role.
Rather surprisingly, it emerges that when a social driver moves consumers
only in less advanced countries producing dirty product, the process of trade
liberalization risks to favor the brown producer, while penalizing the green
rm.
This e¤ect is never found in the scenario with relative preferences in
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both countries: in that case, we prove that both equilibrium prices decrease
with trade liberalization. Further, when the social component is extremely
signicant, the equilibrium quantities decrease as well with a negative e¤ect
on prots of both producer. Still, when this component is not so relevant, it
may happen that the equilibrium quantity of the green good increase with
trade liberalization, while that of the brown product decreases. When this
happens, it may hold that the green producer takes advantage from the
liberalization of the trade, while the brown producer is penalized from it.
5.2 Relative preferences in country G
In this setting with relative preferences arising only in country G, we observe
the same qualitative ndings emerging when relative preferences arise in both
countries. For clarity of exposition, we relegate to the Appendix the formal
details of this scenario. We nd that the price and the quantity of the brown
variant at equilibrium are lower than in the baseline when the international
market is free enough, while the equilibrium price and quantity of the green
product are always higher, irrespective of trade cost.
Further, in line with the general analysis, we observe that whenever the
intensity of relative preferences is relatively low (resp. high), trade liberal-
ization raises (resp. decreases) the equilibrium demand of both brown and
green goods. For intermediate values of this intensity, the demand of the
green good increases while that of the brown good decreases. Both equilib-
rium prices decrease with trade liberalization. Nevertheless, it is interesting
to notice that:
Proposition 5 Trade liberalization favors the green producer more when
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consumers in both countries display relative preferences than in the case when
these preferences arise only in country G:
Proof. See Appendix.
Clearly, the larger the number of countries, in which consumers show
relative preferences, the stronger the incentive for rms to produce green
goods in the light of the increasing liberalization process.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we investigate the e¤ect of relative preferences and trade lib-
eralization on the equilibrium outcome of an open economy of two countries
and two rms. To this aim, we have analyzed a North-South model with a
green rm located in the more advanced area and a brown rival producing a
dirty good in the less developed country. Our main results concern the e¤ect
of trade liberalization on good prices and on pollution. We nd that lowering
trade costs may lead to an increase in prices and in the level of production of
brown goods. This result emerges when citizens in the developed economies
do not attribute a social content to green consumption.
We believe that environmental attitudes, dictated by relative preferences,
are a product of economic and environmental conditions in the country of
residence but are also a product of cultural orientations. As such, they can
be strongly a¤ected by the institutional setting of the country. Embracing
this view, the current US presidential race may have strong impact on the
position of US with respect to environmental issues within US and worldwide.
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Appendix
Relative preferences in country G
In this section, we provide the details for the scenario in which relative pref-
erences appear in country G. We nd that the equilibrium prices are given
by
pG = (qG   qB) (G+B+2)2qG (qG+qB)(4qG qB)(+1)
pB = (qG   qB) (G+B+2)qB 2(qG+qB)(4qG qB)(+1)
Notice that pG > 0 always holds while the positivity of the equilibrium
price pB is met i¤B  _B where _B = 2(qB+qG) qB(2+G)qB :
The corresponding equilibrium market shares are then:
xG =
(G + 2 + B)2qG   (qG + qB)
4qG   qB
xB = qG
(G + 2 + B)qB   2(qG + qB)
qB (4qG   qB) :
For the positivity of the market share xB ; the same argument used about
pB applies so that x

B > 0 i¤B  _B.
Proof of Proposition 5
From standard computations, @x

G
@
= BqB 2qB 2qG
qB(4qG qB) R 0 ,  S _ and
@xB
@
= qB+qG 2BqG
qB 4qG R 0 ,  S : Notice that  < _ < 
0
G always holds:
Accordingly, when  < _ <  < 
0
G; then the equilibrium demand of the
green goods increases with trade liberalization in the general setting with
relative preferences in both countries. Still, it reduces in the particular case
where relative preferences arise only in country G:
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